Seven years in jail, but no proof of dowry death: Supreme Court corrects trial court error – here’s what the case is about
The Court observed that the Trial Courts have been repeatedly committing errors in applying the essential ingredients of these offences, without undertaking a careful and rigorous scrutiny of the evidence as mandated by law.Brief Facts:The appellant, Karan Singh, was married to Asha Rani on 25.06.1996.
On 02.04.1998, within seven years of marriage, Asha Rani was found dead in her matrimonial home.
The post-mortem report opined that the cause of death was asphyxia due to hanging, indicating the death as suicide.Following her death, the appellant and his parents were charged with the offences under Section 304-B (dowry death) and Section 498-A (cruelty) of the IPC.
During the trial, the prosecution primarily relied upon the statements of the deceased’s mother (PW-6), brother (PW-7) and maternal uncle (PW-8) to establish and sustain the allegations of dowry death and cruelty.
While the parents were acquitted by the Sessions court, Karan Singh was convicted for the offences.
He was sentenced to seven years rigorous imprisonment, for the offence of dowry death and one year’s rigorous imprisonment for cruelty, along with fine of Rs.500/- and a default sentence of three months.
Which was subsequently affirmed by the High Court.
Aggrieved by the findings of the trial court and High Court, Karan Singh approached the Supreme Court, contending that the allegations made by the prosecution witnesses, regarding the demand of dowry were omissions.
It was further contended that there was no evidence to establish that the deceased was subjected to cruelty “soon before her death”.
Reliance was placed on Charan Singh @ Charanjit Singh v.
State of Uttarakhand (2023 SCC OnLine SC 454) to argue that mere allegations of dowry demand, without proof of cruelty soon before death, are insufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 304-B IPC.The prosecution in order to sustain the conviction, relied on the statements of the deceased’s mother (PW-6), brother (PW-7) and maternal uncle (PW-8) and submitted that there is more than sufficient evidence on record to establish demand of dowry.
It was alleged that the deceased was subjected to persistent dowry demands and cruelty by the appellant including demands for a motorcycle, refrigerator, mixi, furniture, cash of Rs. 60,000/- for buy of jeep from the deceased mother.Analysis of the Court:The court, while considering the submissions reiterated that only when all four ingredients are established can a death be termed as “dowry death” under Section 304-B of the IPC.
It emphasized that the prosecution must strictly prove the essential ingredients to attract the provision.The court reiterated:6. The following are the essential ingredients of Section 304-B:
- The death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily injury, or must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances;
- The death must have been caused within seven years of her marriage;
- Soon before her death, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by the husband or any relative of her husband; and
- Cruelty or harassment must be for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry.
The Court further clarified that the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is not automatic and does not arise merely because the death occurred within seven years of marriage.
The presumption of dowry death can be invoked only when it is first shown that “soon before her death” the woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with the demand of dowry.
The court stressed that the foundational facts must be established through reliable and credible evidence, and unless these ingredients are proved, the statutory presumption under section 113-B cannot be applied.The court observed:8. In this case, there is no dispute that the death of the appellant’s wife occurred within seven years of the marriage………………………..The presumption under Section 113-B will apply when it is established that soon before her death, the woman has been subjected by the accused to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry.
Therefore, even for attracting Section 113-B, the prosecution must establish that the deceased was subjected by the appellant to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand of dowry soon before her death. Unless these facts are proved, the presumptions under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked.The Court found that the prosecution evidence was insufficient and unreliable.
The testimony of PW-6 (mother) contained several allegations of dowry demand that were absent from her initial police statements, amounting to material contradictions under Section 162 CrPC and indicating afterthoughts.
Importantly, her testimony failed to establish any specific act of cruelty attributable to the appellant.The evidence of PW-7 (brother) was also found to be vague and unsupported by earlier statements, with no proof of cruelty soon before the death.
PW-8 (maternal uncle) had no personal knowledge, and his belated statement did not strengthen the prosecution case.Accordingly, the Court held that the prosecution failed to establish cruelty or harassment in connection with dowry, and the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act was wrongly invoked.The bench comprising of Justice Abhay S.
Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, further expressed serious concern that despite a plethora of authoritative judgements and repeated explanations by the Supreme Court on scope and application of Section 304-B IPC, trial courts continue to apply the provisions in a mechanical manner.
The Court cautioned that such lapses result in convictions based on moral suspicion rather than legal proof. Accordingly, the Court called upon State Judicial Academies to step in and strengthen judicial training, so as to ensure proper understanding and correct application of the statutory requirements and set aside the impugned judgements.The court held as follows:17. “………………Therefore, the prosecution did not prove the material ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 304-B.
Not a single incident of cruelty covered by Section 498-A was proved by the prosecution.
Section 304-B of the IPC was brought on the statute book in 1986.
This Court has repeatedly laid down and explained the ingredients of the offence under Section 304-B.
But, the Trial Courts are committing the same mistakes repeatedly. It is for the State Judicial Academies to step in.
Perhaps this is a case of moral conviction.18 Therefore, both the offences alleged against the appellant were not proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt……..”(Vatsal Chandra is a Delhi-based Advocate practicing before the courts of Delhi NCR.)